Fertility Patterns in the Roma Population of Spain by Aisa, Rosa et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fertility Patterns in the Roma
Population of Spain
Rosa Aisa and Joaqu´ın Andaluz and Larramona Gemma
University of Zaragoza
15. January 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52972/
MPRA Paper No. 52972, posted 16. January 2014 03:46 UTC
1 
 
Fertility Patterns in the Roma Population of Spain 
Rosa Aisa1, Joaquín Andaluz2, and Gemma Larramona3 
University of Zaragoza 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine the significant variables in the fertility patterns of 
the Roma population in Spain. Family and home production are two of the idiosyncratic 
features of this minority group, and our theoretical and empirical analyses take account 
of both, as well as other variables that appear in the existing literature. Our main 
insights are that a greater bargaining power of parents, with respect to their adult 
children, and a greater involvement of adult children in the production of the family 
good, are major contributory factors in increasing the number of children. 
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1. Introduction 
Countries with high and growing per capita income have, in recent years, 
experienced significant declines in fertility, to the extent that most of those countries are 
now below replacement-level fertility. This phenomenon has no precedent in recorded 
history (Feyrer et al., 2008).  The pattern shown by macroeconomic indicators tends to 
obscure the differences in fertility levels across minority ethnic populations in 
developed countries. Since the presence of minority ethnic groups is rather the rule than 
the exception (Berritella, 2012), it is no surprise that there exists an extensive literature 
on why ethnic minority groups have different levels of fertility1. Education and income 
appear to be the main factors influencing fertility decisions; more educated and/or 
wealthier parents decide to have fewer children, due to the greater time-opportunity cost 
of child-rearing (De la Croix and Doepke, 2003). Thus, if education and income explain 
fertility behavior, differences in fertility between minorities and majorities should 
disappear once these variables are controlled for (the assimilation hypothesis: Gordon, 
1964). The minority group status hypothesis rejects assimilation theory, establishing 
that the minority characteristic exerts an independent effect on fertility due to the 
insecurities and marginality associated with minority group status (Goldscheider and 
Uhlenberg, 1969).  
In this paper, we analyze the fertility patterns of a particular minority ethnic 
group, the Roma population of Spain. Spanish laws covering the protection of data2 
prohibit the incorporation of ethnic variables in the census, making the study of ethnic 
groups in Spain problematic. The intercultural social non-profit organization Fundación 
Secretariado Gitano3 (FSG) has allowed us to access the microdata of a transnational 
survey, carried out jointly by the Soros Foundation and the Open Society Institute in 
20114. This database considers the labor situation of the Spanish Roma population and 
comprises, apart from income and education, other demographic, sociological, and 
                                                 
1 For a revision of the literature see, for instance, Poston et al. (2006) and Chabé-Ferret and Ghidi (2013)  
2 Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal. See Appendix 
III of the report "Ethnic statistics and data protection in the Council of Europe countries” elaborated by 
Simon (2007) 
3 For more details, see  http://www.gitanos.org/quienes_somos/mision_estrategia.html.en 
4 See Spanish and Migrant Roma Population In Spain: Employment And Social Inclusion – 2011- A 
Comparative study, page 203, http://www.gitanos.org/upload/14/10/Situatia_romilor_-_english.pdf 
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economic characteristics, making it possible to advance our knowledge of other aspects 
of this minority ethnic group, e.g. its fertility patterns.  
Family ties and home production are two idiosyncratic features of this minority 
ethnic group. The family is the core of the Spanish Roma social organization; family 
members usually live very close to each other, so that family ties are very strong; family 
beliefs and preferences matter much more than the market and institutions; and 
members of Spanish Roma families have a high level of involvement in family 
businesses. More than 11% of the Roma population in Spain is involved in a family 
business, compared to only 3% of the total Spanish population5.   
In our analysis, family ties and home production (i.e. family business and 
housework) are considered to play an important role in determining the fertility patterns 
of the Spanish Roma population. Both factors are present in the study by Alesina and 
Giulano (2010), who establish that strong family relationships are associated with larger 
families, and that strong family ties are linked to more time spent in home production 
(in the form of housework). In a more recent working paper published in 2013, the same 
authors claim that beliefs in the importance of the family may cause a specialization in 
family- based businesses, which in turn reinforces the attachment to the family. We 
consider both housework and family business to be what the economic literature refers 
to as the family good6.   
We first build a family bargaining framework that allows us to analyze the intra-
family allocation of effort from parents and their young adult children to the production 
of a family good7 (adult children living with their parents are rarely included as decision 
makers in theoretical models; Doss, 2013). Specifically, we present a family model 
where a parent and their adult children play a two-stage game. In the first stage, the 
parent unilaterally decides the number of children, and in the second stage, the effort 
devoted to the family public good by each family member is deduced. That it is to say, 
while the number of children is an individual parent’s decision, the amount of family 
public good is a bargaining decision, given that both decisions are interconnected. 
Solving the game, the parent’s bargaining power, together with the family members’ 
                                                 
5Source: own elaboration using the 2011 Spanish Roma Population Survey (SRPS) provided by FSG and 
the Spain Economically Active Population Survey (Statistical Spanish Office:  
http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_mercalab_en.htm) 
6 In the family economics literature, the family good is also referred to as a household public good. 
7 See McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and Brown, 1980 and Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, among 
others. 
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productivity for the family good, emerge as factors influencing the parental decision on 
the optimal number of children.  
The second step in our analysis is empirical. Using the 2011 Spanish Roma 
Population Survey (SRPS) elaborated by FSG, and introducing education, income, labor 
status, gender, age - and certain idiosyncratic cultural aspects of the Spanish Roma 
population as control variables - we find support for our theoretical thinking: those 
Spanish Roma families in which the head of the family presents a greater bargaining 
power are those with more children. Furthermore, the young adult children’s degree of 
contribution to the family good, as an approach to their level of productivity in this 
family good, affects positively the number of children.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis 
of the Roma population in Spain. Section 3 sets up the model and derives the basic 
theoretical findings. Our empirical study is presented in Section 4, and Section 5 
outlines our conclusions.  
 
2. The Roma population in Spain 
The Spanish Roma population is formed by the groups who first arrived in Spain 
in the 15th Century. They have shown strong group cohesion, and maintained their 
distinctive characteristics over time8. The estimated number of Roma living in Spain is 
around 700,000 (Council of Europe9, 2007), a figure similar to that of Russia. Only 
Turkey and Romania (with 1.9 million and 1.85 million, respectively) have higher 
Roma populations. These populations are not homogeneous groups; depending on their 
geographical spread, five Roma categories are distinguished10. These are the Kalderaši 
(the most numerous), in the Balkans, many of whom migrated to Central Europe and 
North America; the Gitanos11 (or Calé) in the Iberian Peninsula, Northern Africa and 
Southern France; the Manush (or Sinti) in Alsace and other regions of France and 
                                                 
8 See Action Plan for the development of the Roma Population, Spanish Ministry of Health, Social Policy, 
and Equality. 
http://www.msssi.gob.es/politicaSocial/inclusionSocial/poblacionGitana/docs/INGLES_ACCESIBLE.pdf 
9 See 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090221234346/http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/documentation/strat
egies/statistiques_en.asp 
10 See Romaninet- A Multimedia Romani Course for Promoting Linguistic Diversity and Improving 
Social Dialogue: Report On Roma People (2009).  
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/projects/public_parts/documents/languages/lan_MP_505602_romanin.pdf 
11 Although the word Gitanos is not an ethnic slur, its utilization is sometimes controversial. 
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Germany; the Romnichal (or Romany) in the UK and North America; and the Erlides 
(or Yerlii) in South-Eastern Europe and Turkey.  
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the distinguishing features of the Spanish 
Roma group is the family structure. Following the criteria of Alesina and Giulano 
(2013)12, the Spanish Roma family could be described as a communitarian family since, 
first, children are subject to parental authority even after marriage and, second, siblings 
are treated equally. The same authors, focusing on the majority ethnic group in the 
country, classify the Spanish population as egalitarian nuclear families, characterized 
by independent living arrangements, together with egalitarian inheritance rules. In 
figures, there are 4.7 individuals living in the average Spanish Roma household, 
compared to the general average of 2.8 individuals in Spanish households13.  
Focusing on Spanish Roma fertility behavior, we analyze the data provided by 
SRPS. This survey is based on the same indicators and methodology used by Spain’s 
Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS)14. The survey universe includes the 
Spanish Roma population residing in the national territory, of 16 years old and over (16 
being the minimum legal age of employment in Spain). The sample size was established 
at 1,497 interviews, which allows us to infer results with a +2.53% margin of error. The 
field work included carrying out a single interview per household, incorporating 
questions about gender, age, and employment variables for all the members of the 
household and, hence, obtaining this information on 5,879 individuals of all ages, and 
on 4,218 individuals of 16 years old and over. The final exploitation of the data applied 
the corresponding weighting factors to balance the interviewee sample15. SRPS covers a 
large number of variables that can be grouped into socio-demographic, economic and 
labor, and cultural characteristics.  
                                                 
12 From the combination of the authoritarian/liberal vertical relationship with the equal/unequal 
horizontal relationship, these authors propose two additional categories: absolute nuclear family and stem 
or authoritarian family.  
13 See Diagnóstico social de la comunidad gitana en España del 2011, page 226 Spanish Ministry of 
Health, Social Policy and Equality. 
http://www.msssi.gob.es/politicaSocial/inclusionSocial/poblacionGitana/docs/diagnosticosocial_autores.p
df. 
14 http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_mercalab_en.htm 
15 For more details about methodology see Spanish and Migrant Roma Population In Spain: Employment 
And Social Inclusion – 2011- A Comparative study, pages 205, 212 and 213.  
http://www.gitanos.org/upload/14/10/Situatia_romilor_-_english.pdf 
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This survey reveals that Spanish Roma Fertility patterns differ from those of the 
majority Spanish population. Table 1 shows the average number of children per 
individual, comparing the Spanish Roma population and the population as a whole.  
 
Table 1: Average number of children. 
Age range  Spanish Roma population Spanish population 
   15-19* 0.24 0.02 
20-24 0.62 0.06 
25-29 1.52 0.42 
30-34 1.81 1.23 
35-39 2.12 1.74 
40-44 2.27 2.00 
45-49 2.37 2.36 
Total 1.48 1.07 
* For Spanish Roma Population the range is 16-19 
Source: Own elaboration from SRPS and 1999 Fertility Survey (Statistical Spanish Office).  
 
Table 1 shows a significant gap between the Spanish Roma population fertility 
patterns and those of the Spanish population at large. To clarify that, since the last 
fertility survey of the general Spanish population was done in 1999, it is not possible to 
make a perfect comparison. An alternative approach, using 2011 as reference year, is 
possible using data included in the study Spanish and migrant Roma population in 
Spain: employment and social inclusion – 2011- a comparative study. Whereas the 
portion of individuals 14 years old and under was 26.3% in the Roma population, this 
portion was 14.75% in the general Spanish population. Moreover, the study also points 
to the fact that the birth rate of the Spanish Roma population is increasing.  
Focusing on income, the Survey of Income and Labor Conditions (SILC) 
indicates a total disposable monthly household income of close to €2,400 for the general 
Spanish population, whereas SRPS shows that this average for the Roma population is 
around €522. More differences arise in terms of education (see Figure 1). Around 50% 
of the Spanish Roma population did not complete primary school, compared to 10% for 
the average Spanish population. At the upper levels of education, almost 24% of the 
general population attained a level higher than secondary school, while this number is 
less than 3% for the Spanish Roma population. Although things are improving, thanks 
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to active campaigns promoted by FSG such as Roma with Studies, Roma with a 
Future16, there is still a very high school drop-out rate before the end of compulsory 
secondary education.  
Figure 1. Percentage of population in all levels of education, 2011. 
0
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45 Spanish Roma population
Spanish population
 
Source: Own elaboration from SRPS and EAPS  
 
Among the stereotypes of Spanish Roma population, the more common is that the 
Spanish Roma do not recognize the value of work. Laparra (2007) provides evidence 
against this assertion; in fact, the Spanish Roma enter the labor market at an earlier age 
and have higher activity rates than the general Spanish population. This author 
highlights the importance of collaboration in family economic activities. Table 2 
presents the percentage of the population by occupation, for both groups.  
Table 2. Percentage of population by occupation, 2011. 
  
Spanish Roma 
population 
General Spanish 
population 
Employee 16.40 38.81 
Self-employee 14.47 7.43 
Assists the family 
business 11.14 0.34 
Looking for a job 27.20 14.19 
Student 4.06 6.75 
                                                 
16 http://www.gitanos.org/campannas/roma_with_studies__roma_with_a_future.html.en 
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Retired 5.56 14.49 
Another pension 4.01 1.09 
Disability 2.51 1.58 
House keeper 14.64 15.31 
No. observations survey 1,497 139,689 
Source: Source: Own elaboration from SRPS and EAPS 
The greatest difference between the Spanish Roma population and the average 
Spanish population is the lower percentage of Spanish Roma employees, compensated 
for by the higher percentage in the category of self-employee, and in the category of 
assistant to the family business. This difference could be explained by the fact that 
46.1% of the working Roma population is employed in one particular type of 
commercial activity, i.e. itinerant trade or street markets.  
The question is whether education, income, and occupation are the only factors 
that determine the fertility patterns of this minority ethnic group. The following two 
sections will establish the theoretical and empirical framework to examine this question.  
  
3. A theoretical framework 
We build a simple model of intra-household bargaining over a public family good 
production. The level of the public family good produced will be the result of a 
bargaining process among parents and their young adult children. Additionally, parents 
also individually decide the desired number of children.  
Let us consider a parent (father or mother) whose preferences are given by the 
following utility function17:  
( , , ) ln ( )P P P P PU Q C t Q C B t= + − ,                                                             (1) 
where Q is the level of a family public good produced by the family members and 
consumed by the family, PC  is the parent private good consumption level, and Pt  is the 
time devoted by the parent to the production of the family public good. This time 
implies a cost in utility terms, B(.) that takes the following functional form:  
2( )  P PB t t= . 
                                                 
17 This functional form is based on Suen et al (2003) 
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This utility cost encompasses individual tastes for work outside the home, and 
monetary opportunity costs of working for the family rather than for others. Note that 
the family public good is not a perfect substitute for market private goods. The utility 
function of a representative young adult child is given by:  
2( , , ) lny y y y yU Q C t Q C t= + − ,                                                            (2) 
with yt being the time devoted by each young adult child to the production of the family 
public good. The interrelationship between parents and young adult children is 
channeled primarily through the family good. The functional forms considered 
guarantee strictly quasi-concave and increasing utility functions of the parent and each 
young adult child. 
We assume that the public good produced by the family members takes a Cobb-
Douglas form: 
  1( ) ( ) , 0 1P yQ t nt
α α α−= < < ,                                                            (3) 
with n being the number of young adult children in the household.  
Focusing now on the budget restrictions of each family member, we denote the 
parent income as PM , devoted to the parent’s own consumption and also to a monetary 
transfer to each young adult children, T. Transfers within families are common (Cox 
and Fafchamps, 2008). To maintain the tractability of the problem, we assume that the 
young adult children do not work outside the family, in such a way that the transfer 
from the parent is devoted to private good consumption.  
We solve a two-stage sequential game under perfect information. In the first stage, 
the parent individually decides the number of children, n, and in the second stage, the 
effort devoted to the family public good by each family member is the result of a 
bilateral bargaining process among the parent and the young adult children.  
Applying backward induction, we begin to solve the second stage of the game.   
Following Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Wolley (2001), the non-
cooperative setting - in which the parent and each young adult child individually decide 
their contribution to the public good production (Cournot-Nash) - is used as a threat 
point for the cooperative Nash-bargaining problem. 
Therefore, the parent problem is given by:  
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2( , , ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( )   
P
P P y P Y P P
t
U t t n t nt C tMax α α= − + + −  , 
subject to P PC M nT= − ,                                        (4) 
and the problem of a representative young adult is given by: 
2( , , ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( )   
y
Y P y A Y y Y
t
U t t n t nt C tMax α α= − + + − , 
subject to TCY = .                               (5) 
This leads to the following first order optimal conditions for At  and Yt , 
respectively:  
(1 ) 2 0,
2 0,
P
P
Y
Y
t
t
t
t
α
α
−
− =
− =
                                                      (6) 
in such a way that the contribution level of the parent to the family good in the non-
cooperative setting amounts to 
1
21
2P
t α− =  
 
, whereas the effort devoted by each young 
adult child to the family good amounts to 
1
2
2y
t α =  
 
. Notice that, at the threat point, the 
optimum contribution of each young adult child to the family good does not depend on 
the number of siblings. Introducing these levels into the utility functions, we obtain the 
optimum utility levels under a non-cooperative setting:  
1(1 ) ln ln
12 2 ln
2 2P P
U n M nT
α αα α
αα
−   − +    −   = + + − −               (7) 
1(1 ) ln ln
2 2 ln
2 2Y
U n T
α αα α
αα
−   − +   
   = + + −                       (8) 
 
In a cooperative equilibrium, the contributions to the family good are Pareto 
efficient. Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier is characterized by the following 
conditioned optimization problem: 
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2
,
2
( , , ) (1 ) ln ln( ) ,Max
. . ( , , ) (1 ) ln ( ) .
P Y
P P y p Y p p
t t
Y P y p Y Y
U t t n t nt M nT t
s t U t t n t Log nt T t
α α
α α
= − + + − −
= − + + −
                           (9) 
The first order conditions are given by:  
(1 )(1 ) 2 0,
(1 ) 2 0,
A
A
Y
Y
n t
t
n nt
t
α
α
+ −
− =
+
− =
                                             (10) 
and hence, we obtain that the Pareto-efficient level of contribution to the family good by 
the parent is 
1
2(1 )(1 )
2P
nt α+ − =   
  whereas that of each young adult child 
is
1
2(1 ) 
2Y
nt α+ =   
 . The difference in the non-cooperative solution is the effect of the 
number of siblings in the level of family good of parent and children.   
   
Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier obtained is: 
( , , )
(1 ) 1(1 ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln ln( ) 1 .
2 2
UPF
P y
P Y
U n U
n n n M nU
α
α α α α α
=
+  +  = − − + + + − + −    
      (11) 
Moreover, the slope of the utility possibility curve is n
dU
dU
Y
UPF
A −= . 
As we have previously mentioned, the allocation of welfare among the family 
members is the result of the Nash bargaining solution corresponding to the following 
maximization problem: 
( ) ( ) (1 ).  
Y
n
UPF
P P Y YU
Max N U U U U
β β−
= − − , 10 ≤≤ β ,         (12) 
where β and (1−β) denote parent and young adult child bargaining power, respectively, 
and PU , YU , denote the parent and young adult child levels of utility obtained at the 
threat point, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that parents treat all children 
equally and hence, no different bargaining powers among siblings emerge.  
12 
 
From the first order condition of this problem: 
0))(1()( =−−+−− A
UPF
AYY UUUU ββ ,                             (13) 
we are able to obtain the optimum levels of utility in the Nash bargaining setting:  
[ ]
[ ]
( , , , , )
(1 ) ln(1 ) ln( ) 2
2
(1 ) ln(1 ) (2 3 ) ln( ) (1 ) (1 )
,
2 (1 )
P P
P
U n M T
Ln M nT
n n n n n n
n
α β
α α α α
β α β β β α β
β β
=
− − + −
= + − +
+ + + + − − + − − −
+
+ −

             (14) 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
( , , , )
(1 ) ln(1 ) ln( ) 2
2
(1 )(1 ) ln(1 ) 1 3 1 (1 ) ln( ) 1
.
2 (1 )
YU n T
Log T
n n n n
n
α β
α α α α
β α β β α β
β β
=
− − + −
= + +
− + + − + − + − + − −
+
+ −

       (15) 
 
Taking into account the optimum level of parent utility in the Nash bargaining, in 
the first stage of the game, the optimal number of children verifies that: 0PU
n
∂
=
∂

and 
therefore, an implicit function that relates , , ,n Mα β  and T emerges. Thus, the optimal 
number of children has a relationship with the child marginal productivity, as well as 
the parent bargaining power. This relationship can only be determined through a 
simulation giving values to the parameters. Figure 3 shows the relationship ceteris 
paribus between parent utility and number of children in the Nash solution for different 
values of parent bargaining power. We observe a positive relationship between the 
optimum number of children and the parent bargaining power, 0
*
>
∂
∂
β
n .  
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Figure 3. Parent utility and optimum number of children in the Nash solution for 
different values of parent bargaining power* 
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*Parameters of the model have been fitted to MP = 1, T = 1/7, α =1/2 
 
Figure 4 combines the optimum number of children with different values of 
parameter α, measuring the child marginal productivity. As expected, the greater the 
child marginal productivity, the higher the optimum number of children, 
*
0n
α
∂
>
∂
.  
Our theoretical framework is related to the explanation proposed by Salcedo et al. 
(2012), who build a model where living with others is beneficial because the costs of 
household public goods can be shared. Since the income elasticity of household public 
 
 
β = 1/2 
β = 5/8 
β = 3/4 
β = 7/8 
14 
 
goods is lower than that of private goods, then public household goods become 
relatively less important as incomes rise, which would cause a decline in optimum 
household size. However, these authors model the household as a group of roommates 
abstracting from intra-household bargaining, and also identify public household goods 
with food consumed at home, housing, and household appliances, abstracting from 
family-based business.  
 
 
Figure 4. Child utility and number of children in the Nash solution for different values 
of parent productivity 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
n
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
UP

 
 
*Other parameters of the model have been fitted to MP = 1, T = 1/7, β =1/2 
 
The next and last step is to check whether our theoretical findings are supported 
by empirical evidence. 
α = 1/8 
α = 1/4 
α = 3/8 
α = 1/2 
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4. Empirical evidence 
 
In our estimations, the dependent variable is the number of children. However, 
since certain factors affecting the likelihood of having children, and those affecting the 
number of children, are linked, we have estimated the model using Heckman’s sample 
selection, in order to obtain unbiased estimations. Implementing the Heckman model 
requires the selection of variables that have an effect on the discrete choice of whether 
or not to have children, but not on the amount of children. We have considered the 
status ‘married’ as the selection variable.  
In order to introduce the bargaining power of parents β as an independent 
variable, we choose two alternative proxies to measure it. The first is a variable that 
counts, apart from the head of the family (the reference person of the interview), those 
members who have a link of brother, sister, brother in-law, sister-in-law, mother, father, 
father in-law or mother in- law, with the head of the family. This number measures the 
magnitude of those who play the role of parent in our theoretical framework, and it 
seems plausible to us that, the higher the number of those who play the role of parent 
within the family unit, the greater the bargaining power of the “parents” dealing with 
young adult children. This variable has been normalized to values between 0 and 1 to fit 
the empirical estimation to the theoretical model.  The second is the health of the head 
of the family. This variable has been built through the answer given by the head of the 
family about his/her health, the answers can be: very bad, bad, regular, well, and very 
well, and the given weights are 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, and 1, respectively. The hypothesis 
considered is that better perceived health of the head of the family will be associated 
with greater bargaining power of the parent. According to the theoretical model, the 
expected sign should be positive.  
The second independent variable that emerges from our theoretical model is the 
productivity of the children for the family public good α. We build a proxy of the latter 
by counting those children over 16 who help with the housework and/or assist in the 
family business, and we normalize to values between 0 and 1. In the first estimation, we 
consider both tasks, housework and family business, to capture family good 
productivity, and in the second estimation, we separate them in order to check the 
robustness of the results. According to the theoretical model, the expected sign should 
be positive.  
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We introduce an extensive number of variables as control variables. Obviously, 
education, income, and occupation are present. Following Sanromá et al. (2009), we 
have assigned 0 years of schooling to those with no formal studies; 3 years of schooling 
to those with incomplete primary education; 6 years for complete primary education; 8 
years for incomplete high school; 10 years for complete secondary education; 14 years 
for a higher level training cycle; 15 years for incomplete tertiary education, 17 years for 
complete tertiary education, and 19 for a doctoral degree.  
Additionally, we consider gender, the age of the head of the household, and 
whether the family resides in a rural or urban area. Cultural and social characteristics 
are also taken into account by way of religion variables and the degree of friendship 
with other ethnic groups.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Table 3 presents the Heckman selection model estimations for different proxies of 
the bargaining power, considering the family public good in its broadest sense, 
including the family business and housekeeping.   
 
Table 3. Empirical estimations. Dependent variable number of children. 
 
Beta proxied as adults Beta proxied as health  
Socio-demographic characteristics                 
Female -0.07701 
 
-0.07125 
 
-0.07198 
 
-0.06600 
 Age  0.04799 *** 0.04807 *** 0.04795 *** 0.04773 *** 
Education -0.00041 
 
-0.00452 
 
0.00140 
 
-0.00305 
 Education squared -0.00047 
 
-0.00024 
 
-0.00066 
 
-0.00037 
 Urban 0.06924 
 
0.04779 
 
0.06920 
 
0.04679 
 Economic and labor characteristics                 
Individual income -0.00708 *** -0.00720 *** -0.00751 *** -0.00762 *** 
Individual income squared 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 
Permanent employee -0.18229 
 
-0.16672 
 
-0.13931 
 
-0.12595 
 Temporary employee -0.07713 
 
-0.08617 
 
-0.02416 
 
-0.03476 
 Self employed -0.23584 
 
-0.22484 
 
-0.19103 
 
-0.17878 
 Assists the family business -0.01084 
 
0.00330 
 
0.09097 
 
0.10746 
 Unemployed previously worked -0.05940 
 
-0.07488 
 
-0.01240 
 
-0.02639 
 Unemployed looking first job -0.19318 
 
-0.22366 
 
0.01200 
 
-0.01398 
 Student-worker -0.23219 
 
1.58376 *** -0.25370 
 
1.51879 *** 
Student 0.36301 
 
0.27792 
 
0.45102 
 
0.36480 
 Retired 0.04223 
 
0.05893 
 
0.22343 
 
0.24337 
 Other benefits 0.26894 
 
0.27284 
 
0.37515 
 
0.38041 
 Permanent disability -0.32521 
 
-0.33666 
 
-0.07358 
 
-0.08825 
 House keeper 0.04337 
 
0.04617 
 
0.11190 
 
0.11447 
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 α 1.10151 ** 1.12050 ** 1.04597 ** 1.06745 ** 
Cultural characteristics                 
Friends from my ethnic group 0.17345 
 
0.26725 
 
0.21547 
 
0.31354 
 
Friends predominantly from my ethnic group 0.24175 
 
0.31700 
 
0.24220 
 
0.32076 
 No matter ethnic group 0.05712 
 
0.11140 
 
0.05594 
 
0.11047 
 Orthodox 
  
-1.74916 *** 
  
-1.75613 *** 
Catholic 
  
-0.20801 
   
-0.20600 
 Protestant 
  
-0.65493 * 
  
-0.65507 * 
Evangelist 
  
-0.24686 * 
  
-0.25984 * 
Other 
  
-0.06813 
   
-0.05088 
 β 2.05619 ** 1.98241 ** 0.41325 * 0.40764 * 
_cons 1.12206 ** 1.30526 ** 1.19067 ** 1.38357 ** 
         SELECTED MODEL                 
Socio-demographic characteristics                 
Married 0.83192 *** 0.82986 *** 1.09648 *** 1.09285 *** 
Female -0.01802 
 
-0.00847 
 
0.15342 
 
0.15772 
 Age  0.04034 *** 0.04018 *** 0.05521 *** 0.05524 *** 
Education 0.03624 
 
0.03110 
 
0.03686 
 
-0.00308 
 Education squared -0.00320 
 
-0.00267 
 
-0.00335 
 
-0.00308 
 Urban -0.28382 *** -0.30769 *** -0.25149 *** -0.27145 *** 
Economic and labor characteristics                 
Individual income -0.00720 *** -0.00764 *** -0.00423 *** -0.00457 *** 
Individual income squared 0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 Permanent employee -0.24186 
 
-0.24299 
 
-0.54985 ** -0.54687 ** 
Temporary employee -0.12318 
 
-0.12413 
 
-0.46780 * -0.45995 * 
Self employed 0.04633 
 
0.06004 
 
-0.12375 
 
-0.11258 
 Assists the family business -0.10453 
 
-0.07723 
 
-0.63735 ** -0.61810 ** 
Unemployed previously worked -0.19798 
 
-0.19794 
 
-0.41552 * -0.41319 * 
Unemployed looking first job -0.48161 
 
-0.48035 
 
-0.82638 *** -0.81202 *** 
Student-worker -1.73435 *** -1.44113 ** -1.82306 *** -1.64065 *** 
Student -0.77429 * -0.80385 * -1.26465 *** -1.27267 *** 
Retired 0.11839 
 
0.11513 
 
-0.54515 
 
-0.53923 
 Other benefits 0.11697 
 
0.11158 
 
-0.10545 
 
-0.10866 
 Permanent disability 0.15068 
 
0.17167 
 
-0.06725 
 
-0.05848 
 House keeper 0.21085 
 
0.20947 
 
-0.20775 
 
-0.19774 
 α 3.18780 ** 3.16324 ** 5.19507 *** 5.12864 *** 
Cultural characteristics                 
Friends from my ethnic group -0.24933 
 
-0.24869 
 
-0.32616 
 
-0.33941 
 
Friends predominantly from my ethnic group -0.17929 
 
-0.19343 
 
-0.18799 
 
-0.20809 
 No matter ethnic group -0.11890 
 
-0.15461 
 
-0.14504 
 
-0.18195 
 Orthodox 
  
-0.88066 * 
  
-0.62885 * 
Catholic 
  
0.19749 
   
0.17616 
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Protestant 
  
0.69680 
   
0.27527 
 Evangelist 
  
0.04812 
   
0.05502 
 Other 
  
0.15301 
   
0.07666 
 β -7.35034 *** -7.39463 *** 0.18270 
 
0.16871 
 _cons 1.63680 *** 1.66127 *** -0.89222   -0.88257   
         Athrho -0.60361 *** -0.60552 *** -0.55136 *** -0.56479 *** 
Lnsigma 0.30636 *** 0.30300 *** 0.30163 *** 0.29958 *** 
         Rho -0.53961 
 
-0.54097 
 
-0.50154 
 
-0.51152 
 Sigma 1.35847 
 
1.35391 
 
1.35206 
 
1.34929 
 Lambda -0.73305 
 
-0.73242 
 
-0.67810 
 
-0.69020 
 
         Wald test of indep. Eqns. 15.39 *** 15.74 *** 12.79 *** 14.32 *** 
R2 0.54   0.54   0.44   0.44   
*, **, *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Rho is negatively signed and different from 0, suggesting that the error term in the 
selection and primary equation is negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved factors that 
make having children more likely tend to be associated with a lower number of 
children. 
Our results indicate that the bargaining power of parents plays an important role in 
determining the number of children in a family. The coefficient of the bargaining power 
variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the greater the parent 
bargaining power, the higher the number of children in the family. The estimation also 
shows a significant relationship between the child contributions to the family public 
good and the number of children in the family. Specifically, the coefficient of the 
parameter is positive and significant in both the determination of children and the 
selection model.  
 The age of the head of the family presents the expected sign; it is positively 
associated with the number of children. Paradoxically, education of the head of the 
family does not affect the number of children, probably because its effect is already 
captured by income and occupation. Income has a non-monotonic relationship, the 
higher the income, the lower the number of children, up to an income threshold that 
turns the relationship positive. Cultural differences also affect the number of children, 
while being Orthodox, Protestant or Evangelist decreases the number of children with 
respect to not reporting any religion. 
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The probability of having children is positively affected by the age of the head of 
the family and the child productivity for the family public good. However, the 
bargaining power of the father has a negative effect on the probability of having 
children. Other negative relationships on the likelihood of having children are 
individual income or being Orthodox. Being a student, employed, unemployed, or 
assisting with the family business, if beta is measured as health, decreases the 
probability of having children. Living in an urban area also decreases the likelihood of 
having children, but it has no effect on the number of children. 
In Table 4, the family good is proxied by family business assistance or, 
alternatively, by housework collaboration. Whereas the bargaining power variable β 
remains statistically significant in all estimations, not to consider the family good in the 
widest sense leads to the variable α losing significance.  
 
Table 4. Empirical estimations. Dependent variable number of children. 
  Family public good as business Family public good as housework 
  Beta (adults)   Beta(health)   Beta (adults)   Beta(health)   
Socio-demographic characteristics                 
Female -0.06917 
 
-0.06394 
 
-0.06671 
 
-0.06051 
 Age  0.05051 *** 0.04984 *** 0.05125 *** 0.04996 *** 
Education 0.00017 
 
0.00077 
 
-0.00280 
 
-0.00248 
 Education squared -0.00056 
 
-0.00063 
 
-0.00036 
 
-0.00039 
 Urban 0.06051 
 
0.05959 
 
0.06010 
 
0.06327 
 Economic and labor characteristics                 
Individual income -0.00753 *** -0.00794 *** -0.00764 *** -0.00798 *** 
Individual income squared 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 *** 
Permanent employee -0.15389 
 
-0.10841 
 
-0.14696 
 
-0.10484 
 Temporary employee -0.06297 
 
-0.01091 
 
-0.05659 
 
-0.00513 
 Self employed -0.17151 
 
-0.12598 
 
-0.15789 
 
-0.11764 
 Assists the family business 0.06681 
 
0.17614 
 
0.08556 
 
0.18981 
 Unemployed previously worked -0.06541 
 
-0.01410 
 
-0.06169 
 
-0.00704 
 Unemployed looking first job -0.19565 
 
0.02099 
 
-0.22012 
 
-0.02562 
 Student-worker 1.63105 *** 1.59565 *** 1.65397 *** 1.61722 *** 
Student 0.37858 
 
0.47610 
 
0.39708 
 
0.51603 
 Retired 0.01802 
 
0.20991 
 
0.03072 
 
0.22723 
 Other benefits 0.29624 
 
0.40079 
 
0.29408 
 
0.40698 
 Permanent disability -0.33869 
 
-0.09335 
 
-0.34034 
 
-0.09348 
 House keeper 0.05348 
 
0.12559 
 
0.06826 
 
0.13425 
 α 0.95303   0.67858   -0.14696   -0.18113   
Cultural characteristics                 
Friends from my ethnic group 0.28783 
 
0.32405 
 
0.22310 
 
0.26080 
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Friends predominantly from my 
ethnic group 0.34887 
 
0.33830 
 
0.27578 
 
0.27183 
 No matter ethnic group 0.14512 
 
0.12956 
 
0.06435 
 
0.05727 
 Orthodox -1.77666 *** -1.79781 *** -1.80973 *** -1.81383 *** 
Catholic -0.20561 
 
-0.20370 
 
-0.20531 
 
-0.20810 
 Protestant -0.63875 * -0.63216 
 
-0.63662 * -0.65223 
 Evangelist -0.22407 
 
-0.23810 * -0.22648 
 
-0.24416 * 
Other 0.02575 
 
0.04610 
 
0.02869 
 
0.04609 
 β 2.03077 ** 0.39334 * 1.85567 * 0.39577 * 
_cons 1.19409 ** 1.31979 ** 1.29207 ** 1.40123 ** 
         SELECTED MODEL                 
Socio-demographic characteristics                 
Married 0.82470 *** 1.07964 *** 0.83903 *** 1.08545 *** 
Female -0.00884 
 
0.15937 * -0.00631 
 
0.16460 * 
Age  0.04176 *** 0.05702 *** 0.04122 *** 0.05674 *** 
Education 0.03203 
 
0.03399 
 
0.02835 
 
0.02786 
 Education squared -0.00265 
 
-0.00298 
 
-0.00242 
 
-0.00259 
 Urban -0.31389 *** -0.27843 *** -0.30663 *** -0.26661 *** 
Economic and labor characteristics                 
Individual income -0.00782 *** -0.00474 *** -0.00780 *** -0.00467 *** 
Individual income squared 0.00000 
 
0.000001 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 Permanent employee -0.23680 
 
-0.53727 * -0.24572 
 
-0.55466 ** 
Temporary employee -0.11229 
 
-0.45935 * -0.12586 
 
-0.47426 * 
Self employed 0.08191 
 
-0.10177 
 
0.07290 
 
-0.10380 
 Assists the family business -0.04069 
 
-0.57623 ** -0.05229 
 
-0.58121 ** 
Unemployed previously worked -0.19070 
 
-0.40761 * -0.20559 
 
-0.42139 * 
Unemployed looking first job -0.47262 
 
-0.80659 ** -0.57802 * -0.92097 *** 
Student-worker -1.43072 ** -1.62608 *** -1.44268 ** -1.65203 *** 
Student -0.78602 
 
-1.25859 *** -0.80575 * -1.28245 *** 
Retired 0.08804 
 
-0.57774 
 
0.08495 
 
-0.53698 
 Other benefits 0.09763 
 
-0.13499 
 
0.09661 
 
-0.11513 
 Permanent disability 0.21173 
 
-0.04932 
 
0.20283 
 
-0.04503 
 House keeper 0.21804 
 
-0.18135 
 
0.19605 
 
-0.21323 
 Children productivity 11.50718 ** 14.98257 *** 5.56288 *** 6.92741 *** 
Cultural characteristics                 
Friends from my ethnic group -0.21795 
 
-0.31522 
 
-0.33818 
 
-0.45870 
 
Friends predominantly from my 
ethnic group -0.16470 
 
-0.19814 
 
-0.30190 
 
-0.34473 
 No matter ethnic group -0.12284 
 
-0.16394 
 
-0.24196 
 
-0.28876 
 Orthodox -0.89607 * -0.65804 * -0.89716 * -0.63916 * 
Catholic 0.20990 
 
0.19031 
 
0.20340 
 
0.17898 
 Protestant 0.70733 
 
0.29117 
 
0.68728 
 
0.26658 
 Evangelist 0.06287 
 
0.07085 
 
0.05703 
 
0.05920 
 Other 0.14485 
 
0.08316 
 
0.14546 
 
0.06722 
 β -7.42672 *** 0.13740 
 
-7.34134 *** 0.21549 
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_cons 1.59958 *** -0.91012   1.73150   -0.81910   
         Athrho -0.62773 *** -0.58723 *** -0.62195 *** -0.61660 *** 
Lnsigma 0.30975 *** 0.30664 *** 0.30906 *** 0.30924 *** 
         Rho -0.55649 
 
-0.52790 
 
-0.55248 
 
-0.54875 
 Sigma 1.36308 
 
1.35886 
 
1.36214 
 
1.36238 
 Lambda -0.75854 
 
-0.71734 
 
-0.75256 
 
-0.74761 
 
         Wald test of indep. Eqns. 18.17 *** 18.7 *** 14.89 *** 16.61 *** 
R2 0.54   0.44   0.54   0.44   
*, **, *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% , respectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Two conclusions arise from this straightforward study. Family and home 
production are two idiosyncratic features of the Roma population of Spain, and it is 
confirmed that both affect the fertility behavior of this minority ethnic group, once we 
control for other factors present in the fertility patterns of other minority ethnic groups: 
occupation, education, and income. The Spanish Roma family is characterized by 
authoritarian vertical relationships, and therefore the parent bargaining power has an 
influence on the number of children in the family unit that we have found to be positive. 
Furthermore, the high degree of assistance from the adult children to the family 
business and to housework (e.g. care of siblings) increases the number of children in the 
family. 
Our second conclusion is the need for more data, in order to advance our 
knowledge of minority ethnic groups. The debate between personal data protection and 
the advance of knowledge is an open question in society, especially when taking 
discrimination into account. The efforts of intercultural, social non-profit organizations 
devoted to obtaining adequate information to ascertain the realities of this ethnic group, 
and to implementing actions to improving Spanish Roma living conditions, and to 
preventing or eliminating all forms of discrimination should, at the very least, be given 
serious consideration. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of children 1008 2.67 1.56 1 13 
Socio-demographic characteristics           
Single 1497 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Married 1497 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Living Together 1497 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Widow/-er 1497 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Divorced 1497 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Separated 1497 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Male (Reference Category) 1497 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Female 1497 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age  1497 36.28 14.79 16 91 
Education 1497 4.45 3.39 0 19 
Urban 1497 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Rural (Reference Category) 1497 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Economic and labor characteristics           
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Individual Income 1466 159.25 105.06 3.12 700 
Permanent Employee 1497 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Temporary Employee 1497 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Self Employed 1497 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Assists The Family Business 1497 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Unemployed Previously Worked 1497 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Unemployed Looking First Job 1497 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Student-Worker 1497 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Student 1497 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Retired 1497 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Other Benefits 1497 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Permanent Disability 1497 0.03 0.16 0 1 
House Keeper 1497 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Illegal Worker (Reference Category) 1497 0.04 0.19 0 1 
α (family good production in widest sense) 1497 0.02 0.10 0 1 
α (family business) 1497 0.004 0.05 0 1 
α (housework) 1497 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Cultural characteristics           
Friends from my ethnic group 1495 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Friends predominantly from my ethnic group 1495 0.32 0.46 0 1 
No matter ethnic group 1495 0.60 0.49 0 1 
No friends (Reference Category) 1495 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Orthodox 1497 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Catholic 1497 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Protestant 1497 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Evangelist 1497 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Other 1497 0.01 0.08 0 1 
No religion (Reference Category) 1497 0.14 0.35 0 1 
β (health) 1494 0.76 0.24 0 1 
β (those with a” parent” role in the family unit) 1497 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.83 
 
Source: SRPS 
 
